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Abstract
Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of
two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of
preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We
then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple
one-to-one matching problem.
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1. Introduction.
Correlation of preferences aﬀects every two-sided market, as has been recognized for
sorority rushes, (Mongell and Roth, 1991), the market for law clerks (Haruvy, Roth and
Unver, 2006) and New York City high school admissions (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak and
Roth, 2006). In particular, correlation of preferences is a strong factor in determining
men’s and women’s aggregate levels of satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale-Shapley
(1962) marriage matching algorithm. For example, for the men-propose G-S algorithm, if
women’s preferences over men are highly correlated and men’s preferences over women are
random, we would expect a high total of rankings by women of their assigned mates (that is,
a low level of aggregate satisfaction among women) because the high correlation of women’s
preferences means they are competing for the same men. The answer to the question of
how men fare in the same scenario is less obvious. To answer this and related questions,
and to increase our general understanding of both the eﬃcacy and workings of the G-S
algorithm, our goal is to quantify the relationship between men’s and women’s satisfaction
with the G-S outcome on the one hand and correlation of men’s preferences and of women’s
preferences on the other. We will ﬁnd that, despite the complex interaction between men’s
and women’s preferences that takes place during a run of the G-S algorithm, aggregate
levels of satisfaction with the outcome can be predicted with some degree of accuracy from
just two numbers, one derived from men’s preferences and one from women’s preferences.
The contribution of this study is two-fold. First there is the above-mentioned quantiﬁcation of the relationship between correlation of preferences and aggregate satisfaction
with the men-propose G-S matching. Second there is our four step methodology described
in the following paragraph. Since we deﬁne a measure of correlation that can be applied
to the preference proﬁle of any group, our methodology has a wide range of application in
the ﬁeld of two-sided matching. Although we limit ourselves to one-to-one matching, our
methodology applies to many-to-one matching. Furthermore, it could be used to study
mechanisms other than the G-S algorithm, and to study the eﬀects of correlated preferences
on measures of social welfare other than the one we use, the sum of a group’s rankings
of their mates. Finally, designers of a matching mechanism could use our methodology to
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determine to what extent the eﬀects of strategic behavior on social welfare are ameliorated
or enhanced by correlation of preferences.
Our quantiﬁcation of the relationship between satisfaction with the G-S outcome on
the one hand and correlation of preferences on the other involves four steps.
Step 1. We deﬁne a measure of correlation for any preference proﬁle, where a preference proﬁle
consists of n ranking lists formed when each of n men ranks n women (or each of n
women ranks n men).
Step 2. We generate a variety of marriage matching problems; that is, we generate a variety
of pairs of preference proﬁles, each pair consisting of a men’s preference proﬁle and a
women’s preference proﬁle.
Step 3. We run the men-propose Gale-Shapley algorithm for each problem generated in Step
2.
Step 4. For each problem generated we calculate the correlation (as deﬁned in Step 1) of each
of the two preference proﬁles, the sum of men’s rankings of their assigned mates and
the sum of women’s rankings of their assigned mates (for the assignment made in Step
3). Then we examine the relationship between correlation and the expected sum of a
gender’s rankings of their assigned mates.
Caldarelli and Capocci (2001) were the ﬁrst to endow men and women with correlated
preferences over members of the opposite sex, then run the Gale-Shapley algorithm using
these preferences. In their study each man m gives each woman w a score S = ηmw + U Iw ,
where ηmw is chosen randomly from (0, 1) and represents a personal dimension of m’s
opinion of w, Iw is chosen randomly from (0, 1) and represents a consensus view of w
and U ≥ 0 is a weighting factor. Then each man uses the scores he has assigned to form
a preference list. Women form preferences similarly. The G-S algorithm was run using
U = 0, U = .1 and U = 1. They found that more desirable individuals do better; that is,
the rankings of their assigned mates are lower, and this eﬀect is greater for U = 1 than for
U = .1. Our study diﬀers from Caldarelli and Capocci in at least four ways: 1) We deﬁne
a measure of correlation for any preference proﬁle. Caldarelli and Capocci’s measure of
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correlation U is deﬁned only for preferences constructed using their method. 2) Even when
applicable , U is a less direct measure of correlation than ours (deﬁned in Section 3 below),
since U can be assigned before the random selections of ηmw and Iw . Therefore U is really
an expected correlation. 3) We use a diﬀerent method of generating correlated preference
proﬁles for reasons explained in Section 7. 4) Our goals are diﬀerent from Caldarelli and
Capocci’s. We are trying to quantify the relationship between a gender’s aggregate level of
satisfaction with the G-S outcome on the one hand and the levels of correlation of men’s
preferences and of women’s preferences on the other; and to produce a methodology with
a wide range of applications.
Similarly, Chen and Sönmez (2006) endow experimental subjects portraying students
with correlated preferences over schools in a study comparing the eﬃcency of three matching mechanisms in a student/school matching problem. The four comments immediately
above distinguishing our work from that of Calderelli and Capocci also apply to Chen and
Sönmez.
Wilson (1972) proved that for any proﬁle of women’s preferences, if men’s preferences
are random, then the expected sum of men’s rankings of their mates as assigned by the
men-propose G-S algorithm is bounded above by n(1 + 1/2 + . . . + n1 ). Knoblauch (2006)
showed that this is also an approximate lower bound in the sense that the ratio of the
expected sum of men’s rankings of their assigned mates and n(1 + 1/2 + . . . +

1
n)

has

limit 1 as n goes to ∞. However, for the broader goal in this paper–quantiﬁcation of
the relationship between satisfaction with assigned mates and correlation of preferences–
simulation is more promising than theoretical work: Roth and Peranson (1999) point out
that economists need to develop “an engineering design literature,” and show through
example that “Theoretical computation can be a big help in this eﬀort.”
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. Section 3 introduces a measure of correlation of preferences. Section 4 describes a method for generating
preferences with varying levels of correlation. Sections 5 and 6 gauge the eﬀects of correlation of preferences on aggregate satisfaction when one gender’s preferences are correlated,
the other’s random, and when both gender’s preferences are correlated, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
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2. Preliminaries.
Our stated goal is to study via simulation the eﬀect of correlation of preferences on
aggregate satisfaction with the G-S men-propose matching in the context of the simplest
version of the marriage matching problem. We therefore begin with n men, m1 , m2 , . . . , mn
and n women w1 , w2 , . . . wn . Each woman ranks the men 1st through nth . We denote wj ’s
ranking of the men by a one-to-one, onto function rwj : {m1 , m2 , . . . , mn } → {1, 2, . . . , n}.
She prefers mk to ml if rwj (mk ) < rwj (ml ). We denote the men’s ranking of the women
analogously.
The G-S men-propose algorithm produces a matching, that is a 1-1 onto function
µ: {m1 , m2 , . . . mn } → {w1 , w2 , . . . , wn }, as follows. In round 1 each man proposes to
his most preferred woman. Each woman proposed to becomes tentatively engaged to the
man she prefers among those who have proposed to her if any. In each subsequent round,
each man not engaged proposes to his most preferred woman among those he has not yet
proposed to. Each woman becomes tentatively engaged to the man she prefers among her
new proposers, if any, and her current ﬁanceé, if she has one, or remains single if she has
neither. The procedure ends, and engagements become marriages, when every woman is
engaged.
The most important property of the G-S algorithm is that it always produces a stable
matching. A matching is stable if there exists no man and woman each of whom prefers
the other to his or her own spouse.
In the following sections we will deﬁne a measure of correlation of preferences, describe
our method for generating correlated preferences, and then proceed to study via simulation
the eﬀect of correlated preferences on aggregate satisfaction with the G-S men-propose
matching.
3. A Measure of Correlation for Preferences.
Our deﬁnition of a measure of correlation of preferences is motivated by the observation that if a women’s preference proﬁle is highly correlated, then Ave 1, Ave 2, . . . , Ave n
tend to be widely spaced, where Ave i is the average ranking of mi by the n women.
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Given a women’s preference proﬁle {rwj (mi )} for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n let
n
Ave i = n1 j=1 rwj (mi ). Then ﬁx integer k ≥ 2 and deﬁne the correlation ρ of the
preference proﬁle by

n
n+1 k
k
i=1 (Ave i) − n( 2 )
n k
ρ=
n+1 k
i=1 i − n( 2 )

(1)

Notice that we have a family of measures of correlation indexed by k, and we can
choose one that predicts well the outcome of the men-propose G-S algorithm. The ﬁrst
term in the numerator of (1) measures the spread of the Ave i’s. The denominator and
the second term in the numerator normalize ρ. The second term of the numerator is the
spread of a perfectly uncorrelated proﬁle in which Ave i =

n+1
2

for every i. The ﬁrst term

of the denominator is the spread of a perfectly correlated proﬁle, that is, one in which all
n women have identical preferences. Thus, ρ = 0 for perfectly uncorrelated preferences
and ρ = 1 for perfectly correlated preferences.
For men’s preferences over women, ρ is deﬁned similarly.
One caveat: there is one type of correlation that our measure does not detect. In
the following example we might describe the preferences as locally determined. Suppose n is even and w1 , w2 , . . . , w n2 rank the men in order m1 , m2 , . . . , mn , while women
w n2 +1 , w n2 +2 , . . . , wn rank them in order mn , mn−1 , . . . , m1 . Then ρ = 0 despite the obvious “local” correlation. It is possible to devise measures of correlation that detect local
correlation, but for this study we will stay with our simple deﬁnition of ρ.
4. Generating Correlated Preferences.
Here is a very simple method that uses groupings of men to generate correlated
women’s preference proﬁles. If n = 100, we can write, for example (20, 10, 70) to indicate that the men are grouped into three sets: the ﬁrst 20 men, the next 10 men and the
ﬁnal 70 men. Then for each woman men m1 , m2 , . . . m20 are randomly assigned rankings
1 through 20, men m21 , m22 , . . . , m30 are randomly assigned rankings 21 through 30, and
men m31 , m32 , . . . , m100 are randomly assigned rankings 31 through 100. Then ρ can be
calculated for the resulting preference proﬁle using (1). In Table 1 we have calculated ρ
with k = 9 for ten groupings. The results will be used in the next section in the comparison
of satisfaction levels and correlation. The groupings were chosen to provide a reasonable
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spread of correlations. Concerning the choice of k = 9, recall that our goal in (1) was
to deﬁne a measure of correlation of preferences that could be used to predict men’s and
women’s levels of satisfaction with the outcome of the G-S algorithm. Through trial and
error we found that the performance of correlation as a predictor of satisfaction improves
as k increases from its minimum value, 2, and this improvement is substantial until k
reaches about 9, after which it is slight.
5. One Gender’s Preferences Correlated, the other’s Random.
In this section we investigate the eﬀect of correlated preferences for one gender on
the satisfaction levels of men and women. This special case is of interest because it is
a transition between the simple and well-studied random preferences case and the more
realistic correlated preferences case, and because, as mentioned in the introduction, there
has been theoretical work done in this case to which our simulation results can be compared.
With n ﬁxed at 100, in this section we generated 200 correlated preference proﬁles for
women for each grouping listed in Table 1. Then for each of the women’s proﬁles generated
we found ρ (with k = 9 in (1)) and also ran the men-propose G-S algorithm for that proﬁle
paired with a randomly generated men’s proﬁle. We ran a quadratic regression for the
sum of women’s rankings of their assigned mates averaged over each grouping against ρ
averaged over each grouping. Results are given in the ﬁrst column of Table 2. The result is
illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 gives the result for sum of men’s rankings of their assigned
mates.
The intuition for Figure 1 is clear. Women’s overall level of satisfaction decreases with
increasing correlation of women’s preferences because highly correlated preferences mean
women are competing for the same men. It is harder to provide intuition for Figure 2,
since increased competition among women does not translate in any obvious way to the
observed (slight) increase in overall satisfaction for men. On the other hand, Figure 2
gives us further insight into Figure 1. The sharp decrease in women’s overall satisfaction
evident in Figure 1 is due in small part to a slight decrease in the number of proposals (see
Figure 2 and notice that M S equals the total number of proposals made) and therefore in
large part to decrease in quality of proposals–with high correlation a proposal by a man
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who has been rejected previously is unlikely to be welcomed.
Next the entire process was repeated with men’s preferences correlated and women’s
random yielding Figures 3 and 4. The intuition for Figure 4 is identical to that for Figure
1. Men’s overall level of satisfaction decreases with increasing correlation because highly
correlated preferences mean men are competing for the same women. The increasing overall
level of satisfaction for women in Figure 3 is explained by the increase in the number of
proposals (see Figure 4) unmitigated by a decrease in quality of proposals, since women’s
preferences are random in Figure 3.
6. Both Genders’ Preferences Correlated.
Now we investigate the eﬀect of correlation when both men’s preferences and women’s
preferences are correlated. We again used n = 100. For each of the 36 ordered pairs of
groupings from table 3, we constructed a women’s preference proﬁle using the ﬁrst grouping
and a men’s preference proﬁle using the second grouping. Then we ran the G-S algorithm
for the proﬁle pair. We carried out 200 trials for each ordered pair of groupings. We then
ran a regression for the sum of women’s rankings of their assigned mate averaged over each
grouping against ρm and ρw averaged over each grouping. The results appear in column 2
of Table 4, which yields the regression equation W S = 2, 069 + 7, 634ρw − 4, 780ρ2w − 661ρm
.
The results are illustrated in Figure 5 where the 36 data points are projected from the
ρm -ρw -W S space into the ρm -W S plane, as are the six lines from the regression surface.
For example the line labeled ρw = .14 is the line of intersection of the plane ρw = .14
with the regression surface, projected into the ρm -W S plane. This is the line that the
regression surface gives as an approximation for the six data points represented by plus
signs in Figure 5. One can also think of Figure 5 as the regression surface and data viewed
from the ρw -axis.
Column 3 of Table 4 and Figure 6 illustrate the results of the regression of M S against
ρm and ρw .
Notice that the approximations in Figures 5 and 6 are not as tight as in Figures 1-4,
which is only natural since in Figure 5 for example we are trying to summarize a more gen8

eral phenomenon−−G-S matching when both genders have correlated preferences−−than
in Figure 1.
Next notice that the ﬁndings in this section are consistent with the ﬁndings and
intuitive explanations of the previous section.
Finally notice that the only coeﬃcient that is not signiﬁcant at the 10% level in Table
4 is the coeﬃcient for whose sign we had no intuitive explanation in the previous section.
7. Concluding Remarks.
We use a method other than that of Calderelli and Capocci for generating correlated
preference proﬁles because our method yields a wider variety of preference proﬁles, in the
sense that two diﬀerent groupings might have the same expected correlation, but diﬀerent
expected levels of overall satisfaction. In fact, after generating our ﬁgures using arbitrarily
chosen groupings, we searched for a grouping that would provide data points well oﬀ our
regression curves. We found that a grouping with a few very unpopular individuals, such
as (97, 3), would result in signiﬁcantly less satisfying outcomes for the gender so grouped
than the regression curves predicted.
Given the complexity of the G-S algorithm, it is not surprising that two numbers, one
for each gender, are not perfect predictors of aggregate satisfaction allowing no anomalies.
We have mentioned two such anomalies, groupings with a few very unpopular individuals
and locally determined preferences. Other properties of preferences that aﬀect aggregate
satisfaction will be dealt with in a later study.
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Table 1. Groupings used when only men’s or women’s lists are correlated.*

Grouping
Random
3,97
10,90
15,85
10,10,80
3,7,20,70
10,10,20,60
5,15,30,50
10,20,30,40
5,10,15,20,20,30
15,15,15,15,15,15,10
Perfect Corr.

Correlation
0.00255
0.00817
0.02644
0.04458
0.06804
0.13535
0.23556
0.37171
0.53749
0.71528
0.94444
1

*Correlation values are averages over two hundred profiles.

1

Figure 1. Women's Preferences Correlated, Men's Preferences Random
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Figure 2. Women's Preferences Correlated, Men's Preferences Random
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Figure 3. Men's Preferences Correlated, Women's Preferences Random
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Figure 4. Men's Preferences Correlated, Women's Preferences Random
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Table 2. Regression results
Women’s Preferences
Correlated

Men’s Preferences
Correlated

WS

MS

WS

MS

Constant

2445.228***
(135.73)

495.410***
(3.83)

1926.587***
(41.86)

1120.161***
(198.64)

ρ

6663.873***
(909.01)

-24.498
(25.65)

-2049.251***
(280.38)

9951.800***
(1330.37)

ρ2

-4219.784***
(927.94)

-38.029
(26.19)

620.435*
(286.22)

-6273.645***
(1358.08)

R2

.945

.908

.979

.948

*Significant at 10%
**Significant at 5%
***Significant at 1 %
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Table 3. Groupings used when both men’s and women’s lists are correlated*

Grouping

Correlation

3,97
3,7,20,70
5,15,30,50
10,20,30,40
5,10,15,20,20,30
15,15,15,15,15,15,10

0.00817
0.13535
0.37171
0.53749
0.71528
0.94444

*Correlation values are averages over two hundred profiles.

7

Table 4. Regression results
Variable

WS

MS

Constant

2068.724***
(143.727)

1228.616***
(148.020)

ρw

7633.702***
(613.912)

- 295.806
(179.058)

ρw2

- 4779.664***
(630.528)

-

ρm

- 660.538***
(173.865)

8672.615***
(632.251)

ρ m2

-

- 5231.072***
(649.363)

R2

0.927

0.942

* significant at 10%
** significant at 5%
*** significant at 1%
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ρw = 0.94
ρw = 0.72
ρw = 0.54
ρw = 0.37
ρw = 0.14

ρw = 0.01

ρm
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ρm = 0.94
ρm = 0.72
ρm = 0.54
ρm = 0.37

ρm = 0.14

ρm = 0.01
ρw
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